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Abstract
Conformity is thought to be an important force in cultural evolution because it has the potential to stabilize cooperation in
large groups, potentiate group selection and thus explain uniquely human behaviors. However, the effects of such conformity
on cultural and biological evolution will depend much on the way individuals are influenced by the frequency of alternative
behavioral options witnessed. Theoretical modeling has suggested that only what we refer to as ‘hyper-conformity’, an
exaggerated tendency to perform the most frequent behavior witnessed in other individuals, is able to increase within-group
homogeneity and between-group diversity, for instance. Empirically however, few experiments have addressed how the
frequency of behavior witnessed affects behavior. Accordingly we performed an experiment to test for the presence of
conformity in a natural situation with humans. Visitors to a Zoo exhibit were invited to write or draw answers to questions on
A5 cards and potentially win a small prize. We manipulated the proportion of existing writings versus drawings visible to
visitors and measured the proportion of written cards submitted. We found a strong and significant effect of the proportion of
text displayed on the proportion of text in the answers, thus demonstrating social learning. We show that this effect is
approximately linear, with potentially a small, weak-conformist component but no hyper-conformist one. The present
experiment therefore provides evidence for linear conformity in humans in a very natural context.
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Introduction
Conformity represents an important aspect of human psychol-
ogy and has been extensively studied in social psychology since the
pioneering work of Asch [1,2]. Studies in human adults (reviewed
by [3]) and children [4,5,6] have shown that confronting
participants with a majority of individuals behaving in a certain
way is often enough to make the participant behave in the same
way, even when this is in strong conflict with their personal
tendency to behave otherwise. In social psychology, the phenom-
enon of conformity is well established, notably in situations in
which participants are trying to achieve effective action, to build
and maintain social interactions and to maintain a positive
evaluation of themselves [3,7].
Building on this work, Boyd and Richerson [8] proposed a more
restricted sense of the term conformity, that we here call hyper-
conformity (see below and Claidie`re and Whiten [9] for an
explanation of the rationale underlying the terminology used here):
this designates an exaggerated tendency to perform the most
frequent behavior witnessed in other individuals (see also [10,11]).
For example, an individual seeing that 80% of their community
exhibit behavior A rather than B would be hyper-conformist if the
probability of their performing behavior A significantly exceeded
0.8. This particular notion of conformity has received considerable
theoretical attention [8,11,12,13,14,15,16,17,18]. In particular,
theoretical and modeling studies have shown that hyper-
conformity can increase the behavioral homogeneity within
groups, and by doing so can (a) facilitate cumulative cultural
evolution [19], on page 145: ‘‘If we are right, culture is adaptive
because it can do things that genes cannot do for themselves.
Simple forms of social learning cut the cost of individual learning
by allowing individuals to use environmental cues selectively. If
you can easily figure out what to do, do it! But if not, you can fall
back on copying what others do. When environments are variable
and the learning is difficult or costly, such a system can be a big
advantage, and most likely explains the relatively crude systems of
social learning commonly found in social animals. Humans have
evolved the additional capacity to acquire variant traditions by
imitation and teaching, and can accurately, quickly, and selectively
acquire the most common variant or the variants used by the
successful. When these kinds of social learning biases are combined
with occasional adaptive innovations and content biases, the result
is the cumulative cultural evolution of complex, socially learned
adaptations, adaptations that are far beyond the creative ability of
any individual.’’), (b) explain the existence of maladaptive cultural
behaviors, (c) potentiate group selection and thereby stabilize
cooperation in large groups (summarized in [19]). These
influential theoretical analyses have suggested that hyper-confor-
mity might be one important factor explaining the divergence
between human culture and animal culture. Empirically however,
evidence for the existence of hyper-conformity in humans remains
limited and controversial [16].
To date, only a handful of experiments have attempted to test
for the existence of hyper-conformity in humans. A general
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approach pioneered by McElreath et al. [20] has been to ask
participants to play a virtual game in which they could access
various kinds of social information (see also [10,13,18,21].
McElreath et al. [20] found that in practice, most participants
did not use social information. Those who did were either
unbiased or showed a small hyper-conformist tendency. Later
studies have investigated further the different strategies partici-
pants use when taking decisions in a complex, temporally variable
virtual environment. These studies have revealed important inter-
individual differences and the use of complex strategies such as
‘choose the best of two options if the average difference between
them is large, hyper-conform to what the majority is doing
otherwise’ [18]. Such experiments allow a precise control over the
information participants can gather (number of participants,
strategy, payoff, etc) through the implementation of complex
virtual computer games. The drawback however is that the
relationship between the behavior of participants in these
experiments and in more natural situations remains in question.
Ideally, precisely controlled, virtual experiments should be
complemented by more natural observations and experiments
assessing the role of conformity in more everyday situations.
Only a few experiments have focused on such non-laboratory
situations [16,22,23]. Coultas [22], for instance, surreptitiously
recorded the tendency of participants to perform a normally rare
action (balancing a keyboard cover on a computer) when the
proportion of individuals doing that action rather than a more
common one (putting the cover next to the computer) was varied.
The results of this study suggested that participants will not be
hyper-conformist unless the proportion of the majority is very high.
Studies that have focused on a conformity bias in these more
natural contexts [16,22,23] led Eriksson et al. [16] to conclude
that:
‘‘Based on our theoretical arguments and simulations, we do
not expect any strong selection pressure for a conformist
bias, and we found no satisfactory evidence that such a bias
actually exists within human psychology.’’ (p 21, ‘conformist
bias’ sensu ‘hyper-conformity’)
Nevertheless, the broader work cited in our opening paragraph
suggests that humans (and possibly animals too, see [24]) - are
sensitive to the relative frequencies of alternative behavioral
options. Given the limited number and context of experiments in
which the frequency of different information has been manipu-
lated, the question of the kind of conformity that humans display
remains quite open.
In this article, we follow the terminology advocated by Claidie`re
and Whiten [9] in a recent review of the literature on conformity.
This terminology is meant to limit the confusion that has arisen
between the modeling literature and experimental work in social
psychology and animal behavior. Accordingly, we will use the
term ‘conformity’ to refer to any positive relationship between the
frequency of a behavioral variant in a population and its
probability of being performed by an individual. The conformity
domain is thus represented by the shaded quadrants in Fig. 1. We
use the term anti-conformity to refer to any negative relationship
between the frequency and the probability to perform a behavior
(the unshaded quadrants in the figure).
We also distinguish between three different grades of conformity
(Fig. 1):
N Hyper-conformity when the probability that an individual
performs the most frequent behavior is greater than the
observed frequency of that behavior in others (NB hypercon-
formity in our terminology has been modelled and defined in
[8] as ‘‘positive frequency dependent’’ or ‘‘conformist’’ bias).
N Linear conformity when the probability that an individual
performs the most frequent behavior is equal to the observed
frequency of that behavior in others (NB modelled and defined
in [8] as ‘‘unbiased transmission’’).
N Weak-conformity when the probability that an individual
performs the most frequent behavior is less than the observed
frequency of that behavior in others but still larger than the
probability of performing the less frequent behavior.
Our experiment aims at establishing the presence or not of
conformity in a natural situation with humans as well as
distinguishing between the three kinds of conformity represented
in Figure 1.
Compared to previous studies, ours takes advantage of a fairly
common situation. Amid the exhibits of the ‘Medicine Now’
gallery at the Wellcome Collection (Euston Road, London),
visitors are struck by an impressive collection of drawings and
writings made by previous visitors and displayed on a large
‘Feedback Wall’. Visitors are encouraged to contribute by leaving
their own comments or piece of art on feedback cards, located on
tables around the wall. Visitors are asked to pick a word or two
from a list of words located on the opposite side of the card (e.g.,
LOVE, PLACEBO, BRAIN, etc) and then, using crayons
provided, draw or write whatever they like on the topic. They
can then display their work on the feedback wall.
If there is no effect of the display on the behavior of visitors,
what we observe on the wall would be a simple reflection of
visitors’ natural preference for writing or drawing. According to
this first possibility, if the display were covered mostly in text for
instance, visitors would still produce the same natural ratio of
Figure 1. Three different types of conformity. In the shaded
domains showing conformity, we distinguish three alternative possibil-
ities: (i) weak-conformity (dotted domain, plain line is a possible
example); (ii) linear conformity (dash dotted line); and (iii) hyper-
conformity (crossed domain, dotted line is a possible example). The
non-shaded domains correspond to anti-conformity, in which individ-
uals adopt the least frequently observed alternative (after [9]).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030970.g001
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writings over drawings. A second possibility however, is that the
proportion of writings on displays influences the visitors’ behavior
in such a way that they tend to do more of the most common
option. According to this second hypothesis, if the display were
covered mostly in text, visitors would produce more writings than
when it is covered mostly with drawings. If we were to manipulate
the proportion of writings over drawings on display, we would be
able to find evidence for or against conformity.
Inspired by the Wellcome Trust display, we devised a similar
set-up in the ‘Living Links to Human Evolution’ Research Centre
of the University of St Andrews, located in Edinburgh Zoo [25].
All visitors to the Zoo are encouraged to visit this Centre and
thousands do so each year. In an experiment described fully below,
we presented a display that invited visitors to respond to questions
about the Centre on A5 cards and we presented selected
contributions on a large board. We manipulated the proportion
of writings versus drawings on display on different occasions and
measured the proportion of writings in the cards submitted in each
period. We were interested in the influence the display could have
on the behavior of participants and we predicted one of the forms
of conformity that we define above.
More specifically, Richerson and Boyd argue that when
individuals have difficulty making decisions because they have
limited information, they should tend to be hyper-conformist ([19]
p120–124). Hyper-conformity, they claim, is an evolved heuristic
that makes us take the most appropriate decision in uncertain
situations ([19] p120) and it can operate only when ‘‘individuals
have difficulty evaluating the costs and benefits of alternative
cultural variants’’ ([19] p206). In our experiment, visitors did not
have information regarding the criteria we would use to select
responses to win the prize, which could potentially have been
based on a complex combination of various factors. For instance, it
could have been a weighted combination of the adequacy of the
answer, the quality of the drawing or writing, the colors used, and
the age and gender of the participant. Given the limited amount of
information and the uncertainty regarding the outcome of the
selection process, theory predicts visitors should be guided by the
display (see [26] for review of empirical and theoretical evidences
[27]). More specifically, the theoretical and modeling studies
described above would predict a hyper-conformist response.
Methods
Study Site
The study took place in the ‘Living Links to Human Evolution’
Research Centre, a field station of the University of St. Andrews
situated within the Royal Zoological Society of Scotland’s
Edinburgh Zoo (see http://www.living-links.org/and [25]). The
Living Links Centre is dedicated to behavioral research on mixed
species groups of brown capuchin monkeys (Cebus apella) and
squirrel monkeys (Saimiri sciureus). The Centre is divided into East
and West wings comprising two enclosures that mirror each other.
Each wing of the building contains one large outdoor enclosure
connected to two inside enclosures with a research room in
between them. Visitors can watch what happens in the inside
enclosures and in the research room by walking along a corridor
that runs at the back of these rooms. Between the two wings of the
building, visitors can view both outside enclosures from a large
platform, or enter an enclosed section of corridor joining the two
wings. This area, known as the ‘Science Exploration Zone’,
contains signs and interactive computer games explaining the
purpose of Centre and the research conducted there.
The present research took place in the ‘Science Exploration
Zone’. In spring 2010 a new public engagement activity was
introduced. A large wooden desk with colored pencils attached on
cables was added to a large bench. Visitors were encouraged by two
signs to answer questions about the Centre and its activity on A5
cards (see material below). One sign read ‘‘Share your ideas! For
people of all ages’’. and the other one read ‘‘Win a Prize! Share your
ideas… Just complete a card! Don’t forget your age and email so we
can tell you if you win! Prizes for adults (over 16) Prizes for children
(below 16) Post your card here’’ (see also Fig. 2). Participants could
write or draw a response, or answer with a combination of text and
drawing. To stimulate participation, a small prize was advertised
and some examples were put on display above the board.
Participants
Participants were visitors to Edinburgh Zoo and the Living
Links Centre. To avoid interfering with the experiment itself,
given its nature, we could not directly record data on visitors
taking part in the activity, but demographic data were collected for
the Centre and the Zoo. Demographic data show that there were
2500 visitors per day in the Zoo on average during June, July and
August 2010: 14% on average were children under 3 years of age,
30% on average were children (aged 3 to 15 years of age) and 56%
on average were adults (above 15 years of age). Mean group size
visiting the Centre was around 3 (Mean+/2SD=3.2+/21.2;
N= 94). Mean visit duration at the Centre was about 12 minutes
(Mean+/2SD=710+/2280 sec; N= 94). Informal observation
suggested that children - sometimes with parents supervising -
were most likely to participate. Large groups were unlikely to
spend time on this activity.
Materials
The general purpose of the activity was to ask visitors questions
to assess their views, knowledge and understanding of the Centre
Figure 2. Schematic illustration of the drawing board and
secured display panel. Q1 to Q4 refers to the questions described in
the main text. Sign 1 reads: ‘‘Share your ideas! For people of all ages’’.
Sign 2 reads: ‘‘Win a Prize! Share your ideas… Just complete a card!
Don’t forget your age and email so we can tell you if you win! Prizes for
adults (over 16) Prizes for children (below 16) Post your card here [arrow
pointing towards the posting slot]’’.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030970.g002
Weak or Linear Conformity but Not Hyper-Conformity
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 3 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30970
in an entertaining way. Visitors could pick a card and draw and/
or write an answer, working on a wooden desk (see Fig. 2). The
desk was 122 cm wide, 48 cm deep, and 17 cm high at the back,
with a slightly angled top to facilitate writing. Six to nine pencils of
different colors were attached to the desk by thin cables. At the
rear were two boxes in which A5 cards were presented, with a
posting slot in the middle to post cards.
Visitors could answer each question on a black and white,
double-sided A5 card. On one side a question was printed at the
top with a black frame (12.5615.5 cm) in which to respond. On
the reverse, optional information was requested (name, age,
gender and email address) along with the following text: ‘‘We will
post the best responses on our website and on the wall at Living
Links with the age and first name of the participant. If you provide
your email address we can let you know if your picture has been
selected. We will not use your email address for any other
purpose.’’ We used the expression ‘best responses’ in order to
emphasize the necessity to behave optimally because the theory
predicts that a hyper-conformity arises when individuals are trying
to behave in the most effective way [8,19]. The expression ‘best
responses’ also leaves somewhat ambiguous what ‘best’ may mean
and therefore preserves the uncertainty of the task. However,
insisting on the competitive aspect of the situation could
potentially favor anti-conformity, the choice of a behavior opposite
to what the majority is doing. In this case, we would expect a
negative, and not a positive relationship between the percentage of
text displayed and the proportion found in the answers (the non-
shaded areas of Figure 1).
Above the desk, a display panel (120690 cm) was used to pin up
16 answers and to give instructions (Fig. 2). Two text blocks
explained the purpose of the drawing board to potential
participants (Fig. 2). Between these text blocks were two lines of
five cards each; two cards were additionally placed on the left, and
four on the right side of the bottom block, respectively.
Before starting the experiment, we analyzed the cards that were
collected as part of the normal functioning of the activity. At the
time, four questions were asked of visitors:
Q1: What does ‘research on animals’ mean to you?
Q2: What do scientists do?
Q3: How did people come to exist?
Q4: Do you know something interesting about monkeys?
From the responses for each question we selected four with only
writing and four with only drawing. This represented a total of 32
cards that could be used to manipulate the proportion of examples
displayed on the wall. During the experiment, only these four
questions and their associated 32 examples were used.
Procedure
Seven sessions for each of five conditions (0, 25, 50, 75 and
100% ‘Text Displayed’) were completed between June and August
2010. Every session started with a selection of the appropriate
number of drawing and writing examples pinned on the display
panel. For instance, for the 25% ‘Text Displayed’ condition we
selected three drawing cards and one writing card for each of the
four questions. In order to keep the display homogeneous the
position of each question was fixed throughout the experiment (as
in Fig. 2). We also preserved a uniform distribution of drawing and
writing by distributing examples evenly across the board.
When the display was ready, the experimenter refilled the
drawing board with 10 blank answer cards for each of the four
questions. Once all 40 cards had been used, the session was
stopped and a new session could be started. Each session took
between half a day and two days, depending on the number of
visitors coming to the Zoo and their willingness to participate.
Data Coding
We were interested in the change in the proportion of text and
drawing in responses resulting from our manipulation of the
proportion of text and drawing on display (% ‘Text Displayed’).
We anticipated that conformity could be manifest in two different
ways; the proportion of text could change within responses on
each card, or the proportion of cards with only text or only
drawings could change. We therefore asked two students, aged 21
and 30, blind to the purpose of the experiment and to the
condition in which each card was realized (the cards were
randomly ordered before coding), to evaluate all cards according
to the following criteria (this is a verbatim copy of part of the
written instructions given to these coders):
Text only. Text only is a card with only text written on it, any
amount, from a single word to several paragraphs (‘smileys’ and
other text associated characters are included). 1: belong to the
category; 0: does not belong to the category.
Drawing only. Drawing only is a card with only drawings on
it but name and age can be included. 1: belong to the category; 0:
does not belong to the category.
Mainly text. Mainly text is a mixed card with text and
drawing but with proper sentences not included in the drawing.
Proper English sentences can be long ‘The monkey is eating an
apple.’ or short ‘Watch!’ and express statements ‘I think we should
go now.’, questions ‘What do you want?’, request ‘Could you come
here?’, command ‘Don’t do that!’, etc. These sentences should not
explicitly be included in the drawing with arrows, text bubble or
anything like that. 1: belong to the category; 0: does not belong to
the category.
Mainly drawing. Mainly drawing is a mixed card with text
and drawing but with no proper sentences or sentences included in
the drawing as part of a legend, speech bubbles, etc. 1: belong to
the category; 0: does not belong to the category.
Quality. The quality of the answer should not reflect your
opinion on the question (whether or not you agree with the answer
given) or the state of the card (foot prints, tears, etc) but rather the
effort the participant has invested in answering the question. Try
to consider this in terms of effort rather than the ability of the
participant. Please rate the quality of the answer using the
following scale. (0) Extremely poor, (1) Very poor, (2) Poor, (3)
Good and (4) Very good, (5) Extremely good.
The first four criteria listed above were used to determine
whether a given card was more of a drawing or of a text nature.
Additionally, informal study of the cards revealed a large
proportion of poor quality answers (scribbles, defaced cards, etc),
so we asked the two coders to rate the ‘Quality’ of each card on the
five point Likert scale described above in order to be able to
exclude very poor quality cards from the analysis.
Finally, to reflect the two different ways in which conformity
could affect the results we calculated two proportions for each
session: % ‘Text Produced’ was the number of cards in Text only
and Mainly text divided by the number of cards in all four
categories; % ‘Text Produced only’ was the number of cards in
‘Text only’ divided by the number of cards in ‘Text only’ and
‘Drawing only’.
Results
Inter-coder Reliability
Inter coder reliability analysis was performed on the full dataset
(1105 cards). Cohen’s Kappa was 95% for ‘Text only’, 90% for
‘Drawing only’, involved in the calculation of % of ‘Text Produced
only’, and 90% for both ‘Text only’ plus ‘Mainly text’, and
‘Drawing only’ plus ‘Mainly drawing’, involved in the calculation
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of % ‘Text Produced’. Given the very high inter coder reliability,
we present the results obtained with data coded by the first coder
only.
Across all conditions, 367 cards from 1105 (33%), rated as
‘Extremely poor’ or ‘Very poor’ by both coders, were excluded
from the analysis. Table 1 summarizes the number of cards
analyzed for each question and category.
Effect of the Proportion of Text Displayed
The analysis of % ‘Text Produced’ and % ‘Text Produced only’
gave qualitatively similar results; we therefore report only the most
comprehensive measure, % ‘Text Produced’.
Firstly, we were interested in the preference of participants to
draw or write, because the effect of conformity is more likely to be
detected when both of the alternative behaviors are likely to occur
with equal probabilities. If one behavior is much more likely than
the other, changes in proportions may be masked by ceiling or
floor effects (because proportions are contained within the [0; 1]
interval). Therefore, when designing the experiment, we chose to
use open questions to stimulate writing and provided blank cards
and color pencils to stimulate drawing, hoping that these two
effects would roughly balance each other. If the two behaviors,
writing and drawing, were equally likely to occur, when the
proportion of ‘Text Displayed’ is 50% the mean proportion of text
found in the answers should also be 50%. It is also the case that if
the two behaviors were equally likely, we could expect 50% text in
a control condition in which no card would be on display.
However, the absence of cards in this scenario makes any
comparison with the other conditions in which there are examples
on display quite remote. We think that comparing the 50% ‘Text
Displayed’ with other conditions offers a more appropriate
control. As illustrated in Figure 3, in the 50% ‘Text Displayed’
condition we found that on average % ‘Text Produced’ is
significantly greater than 50% (Mean+/2SD=69%+/216.6,
N= 7; two-tailed one sample t-test, t(6) = 3.006, p = 0.024),
suggesting that there was a slight preference for writing over
drawing. There was much scope however, for ‘Text Produced’ to
increase or decrease without ceiling or floor effects. In only one
session, in the 100% ‘Text Displayed’ condition, did % ‘Text
Produced’ reach 100%; and it never fell to 0%.
The preference for writing is also confirmed by the fact that
when there is no text on display, the proportion of text produced
in the answers is significantly greater than 0 (Mean+/
2SD=38%+/217.2, N= 7; t(6) = 5.844, p = 0.001). This bias
for writing, inherent in the design of the experiment, has to be
taken into account when comparing Figure 1, the theoretical case
in which the two alternatives are perfectly equivalent, with
Figure 3, in which there is a preference for writing (see below).
Next, we analyzed the main effect of ‘Text Displayed’ on ‘Text
Produced’ using the statistical package R [28] to construct a
binomial generalized linear model with an identity link. We found
a highly significant effect of ‘Text Displayed’ on ‘Text Produced’
(Pearson Chi-square, d.f. = 1, Deviance = 126.09, p,0.001).
We were further interested in the nature of the conformist effect
and in particular in the presence of a non-linear effect that would
potentially reveal the presence of weak- or hyper-conformity. We
fitted a linear and cubic model to our data (using the same
generalized linear model procedure) and calculated the AICc
(Corrected Akaike Information Criteria [29,30]) and AICc weight
for the two models (results are summarized in Table 2). If there is a
weak- or hyper-conformist effect, the cubic model should fare
better than the linear one.
As can be seen in Table 2, the difference between the linear and
cubic model is small. There is a slight advantage for the cubic
model over the linear one (AICc is used to identify which model
provides the best fit to the data; the lower the AICc the better the
model fit. The difference in AICc as well as the difference in
weight gives an indication of the advantage of one model over
another. The weight, in particular, can be understood as the
relative likelihood of each model being the best model in the set.
Here there is roughly a 60/40 split between the two models;
therefore, there is a small advantage of the cubic model over the
linear one). However, as can be seen in Table 3, the contribution
of the cubic term is not significant, it only approaches significance.
These results (see also Figure 3) therefore suggest that there might
be a small nonlinear effect on top of the main, linear one ([30]
recommend relying exclusively on AIC values when fitting models,
not on the significance of the effect of single parameters.).
It is of theoretical interest whether any such effect is more
consistent with a hyper-conformist effect rather than a weak one.
Weak- versus hyper-conformity can be discriminated by the shape
of the best fit: if it is S-shaped it corresponds to hyper-conformity
and an inverse ‘S’ corresponds to weak-conformity (Figure 1). A
simple visual inspection of Figure 3 reveals that the curve
corresponds to weak-conformity and not to hyper-conformity
(More precisely, using the results of the model described in Table 3,
we find that the second derivative of the cubic function is positive
between 0 and approximately 56.8% and negative afterwards).
To summarize, we found a positive and significant effect of
‘Text Displayed’ on ‘Text Produced’, showing a general positive
relationship between the two variables and therefore, according to
our definition, a conformist effect. When we investigated further
the nature of that effect, we found a small advantage of the cubic
model over the linear one, suggesting that there might be small
nonlinear effect on top of the main linear one. This effect would
correspond to a small weak-conformist effect and we therefore
Table 1. Frequency table of number of cards analyzed for each question and category.
Question Category
% Text Displayed Q4 Q3 Q1 Q2 Text only Mainly text Drawing only Mainly drawing Total
0 39 31 35 36 22 28 65 26 141
25 39 36 36 30 56 30 49 6 141
50 45 41 31 41 67 42 33 16 158
75 46 35 24 29 79 26 23 6 134
100 44 41 44 35 136 16 9 3 164
Total 213 184 170 171 360 142 179 57 738
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030970.t001
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conclude that the main effect corresponds essentially to linear
conformity, with potentially a small additional weak-conformist
effect. We did not find evidence of hyper-conformity.
Discussion
Using a real, everyday setting, in which visitors to an exhibit
could write or draw on a card and post their answer for future
display and enter a prize draw, we found a strong and significant
effect of the manipulation of the proportion of text displayed on
the proportion of text produced in the answers. Participants in this
situation therefore showed clear evidence of conformity; they were
more likely to write when there was a greater proportion of text
displayed.
We were further interested in teasing apart the three kinds of
conformity described in the Introduction (recall Figure 1). We
found that the frequency of text over drawing had a strong effect
on the behavior of participants, but this effect was essentially
linear, with some evidence of an additional weak-conformist
tendency rather than with hyper-conformity.
Theoretical modeling studies have shown that hyper-conformity
can evolve to deal with environmental uncertainty. In an uncertain
environment, hyper-conformist individuals may do better than
linear or weak-conformist individuals because they are more likely
to adopt the most frequent behavior; which is likely to be
appropriate [8]. In line with this argument, experiments have
focused on contexts in which participants are uncertain about the
outcome of their behavior. The context of our experiment is also
uncertain because participants were not aware of the criteria and
procedures that determined what kind of answer was likely to be
successful in getting displayed. In order to cope with this
uncertainty, participants could look for additional information
and use examples on display as a source of information.
Nevertheless, participants failed to be hyper-conformist in our
experiment.
Other factors, despite uncertainty, that can influence the
strength of hyper-conformity have been less studied but two could
potentially explain our results. First, the competitive aspect of the
experiment might have favored distinctiveness rather than
conformity. However, an advantage of our design in this respect
is that distinctiveness regarding the means to answer is limited
(there are only three possibilities, one can draw, write or do both to
answer a question - and in three out of five conditions there were
Figure 3. Influence of % ‘Text Displayed’ on % ‘Text Produced’. Circles represent proportion for each of the 7 sessions in the 5 conditions
(summed across all questions asked). Disks represent the mean over the 7 sessions and error bars are+/2standard deviation for % ‘Text Produced’ in
each of the five experimental conditions (0, 25, 50, 75 and 100% ‘Text Displayed’). The solid line represents the linear fit and the dotted line the cubic
fit using the parameters in Table 3.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030970.g003
Table 2. Comparison between the null, linear and cubic
models.
Model N Log Likelihood AICc AICc weight
Cubic 4 281.83 171.72 0.61
Linear 2 284.29 172.60 0.39
Null 1 2147.48 296.97 0.00
The linear and cubic models fare better than the Null model of a constant ratio
of Text over Drawing. Furthermore, there is a slight advantage of the cubic
model over the linear one as can be seen by compaing the AICc weights.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030970.t002
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already both drawings and writings on display). Furthermore, if
distinctiveness regarding writing or drawing had been important,
we would have expected a negative relationship between what was
displayed on the board and the response of the participants, which
is the opposite of what we find. We conclude that the absence of
hyper-conformity in the means to answer the questions is unlikely
to be explained by any significant pressure for distinctiveness.
A second factor that could explain the absence of hyper-
conformity might be a lack of motivation. According to this
hypothesis, the stakes might have been too low to induce hyper-
conformity in the participants. However, if motivation was low, we
would expect participants not to pay attention to the display and
this would have resulted in an absence of conformity (a straight
horizontal line in Figure 3). To the contrary, participants in our
experiment were clearly influenced by the cards on display. It
remains an empirical question whether the shape and strength of
conformity can be influenced by motivation. This represents an
interesting unexplored avenue for future research that could
potentially deepen our understanding of conformity.
We note, however, that our results and those of others
[16,22,23,31] show that participants tend not to be hyper-conformist
in natural situations and that results in more controlled, but also
more artificial settings do not provide compelling evidence that such
a bias exists [10,13,18,20,21,32]. At one extreme, lack of evidence
for such a bias in these contexts could mean that it is actually rare or
absent in humans [16] and thus that although hyper-conformity
could theoretically be an important evolutionary force it has not in
fact evolved, for reasons yet to be established. However, only a few
experiments specifically addressing the existence of hyper-conformi-
ty in humans have been carried out so far, so it would be premature
to settle on this conclusion at this juncture.
Another possibility to explain the lack of evidence for hyper-
conformity is that experiments have focused on a very specific
context. In social psychology two kinds of motivations underlying
conformity have been recognized [33]. According to Campbell
and Fairey [34]:
‘‘Informational influence is based on the desire to be accurate;
others’ responses are used as a source of information about
reality, and people conform because they believe that the
others may be correct. Normative influence is based on the
desire to maximize social outcomes. Even when people
believe the others are wrong, they may conform in order to
gain the rewards or avoid the punishments that such
agreement and disagreement mediate.’’ p 458
Being conformist in an uncertain situation would correspond to
informational conformity because others’ behavior is used as a
source of information about the situation. It could be that weak-
and linear conformity are associated with informational confor-
mity and hyper-conformity could be associated with normative
conformity [9]. According to this hypothesis, future research on
the existence of hyper-conformity might be well advised to focus
on the normative context.
Finally, from an evolutionary point of view it is important to
note that the combination of a slight preference for one of two
options - writing text in our experiment – together with linear
conformity produces convergence toward the more common
option. Imagine we were to start a new experiment with only
drawings on display for the first session and then, for each new
session, with a random selection (among the not too low-quality
cards) of the cards from the previous session. Based on our results,
we can predict that the proportion of writings would progressively
increase to reach roughly 80%. A slight tendency to perform one
behavior over another (what is often referred to as a direct or
content bias, [8]), combined with linear conformity, can therefore
be amplified by cultural transmission and increase group
homogeneity. Given such a process, the advantages of hyper-
conformity over simple linear conformity are not so obvious. This
issue deserves to be studied empirically in more substantial ways,
extending to the variations in context discussed above.
In conclusion, there is a renewed interest in the study of
conformity because theoretical models suggest that hyper-
conformity could be a very important force in cultural evolution
and recent experiments with animals indicate that conformity
might not be uniquely human (see for instance [24,35,36,37]).
However, few experiments on humans have attempted to study the
influence of the frequency of different information on behavior in
a natural context.
The present experiment provides evidence clearly inconsistent
with hyper-conformity in humans in a very natural context. By
manipulating the proportion of writings vs. drawings on display,
we were able to show linear or slightly weak-conformity but not
hyper-conformity.
However, even if hyper-conformity is not present in informa-
tional contexts, it might still occur in more normative ones. Future
experiments looking for evidence of hyper-conformity should
therefore also explore more normative contexts.
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Table 3. Parameters for the linear and cubic models.
Linear model Cubic model
Parameters Intercept Linear term Intercept Linear term Square term Cubic term
Estimate 4.11E-01 5.18E-01 3.57E-01 1.39 21.98 1.16
Std. Error 3.00E-02 3.90E-02 4.00E-02 3.97E-01 9.83E-01 6.28E-01
z value 13.46 13.27 8.93 3.5 22.02 1.85
p value ,0.001 ,0.001 ,0.001 ,0.001 0.043 0.064
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0030970.t003
Weak or Linear Conformity but Not Hyper-Conformity
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 7 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30970
References
1. Asch SE (1955) Opinions and Social Pressure. Scientific American 193: 31–35.
2. Asch SE (1956) Studies of independence and conformity. 1. A minority of one
against a unanimous majority. Psychological Monographs 70: 1–70.
3. Cialdini RB, Goldstein NJ (2004) Social influence: Compliance and conformity.
Annual Review of Psychology 55: 591–621.
4. Walker M, Andrade M (1996) Conformity in the Asch task as a function of age.
Journal of Social Psychology 136: 367–372.
5. Corriveau K, Harris P (2010) Preschoolers (sometimes) defer to the majority in
making simple perceptual judgments. Developmental Psychology 46: 437–445.
6. Corriveau K, Fusaro M, Harris P (2009) Going with the flow: Preschoolers
prefer nondissenters as informants. Psychological Science 20: 372–377.
7. Cialdini RB, Trost MR (1998) Social norms, conformity, and compliance. In:
Gilbert DT, Fiske ST, Lindzey G, eds. The handbook of social psychology. 4th
ed. New York: McGraw-Hill. pp 151–192.
8. Boyd R, Richerson PJ (1985) Culture and the evolutionary process. Chicago:
University of Chicago Press . 331 p.
9. Claidie`re N, Whiten A (2010) Integrating the study of conformity and culture in
humans and non-human animals. Psychological Bulletin. Vol 138(1), 126–145.
10. Efferson C, Lalive R, Richerson PJ, McElreath R, Lubell M (2008) Conformists
and mavericks: the empirics of frequency-dependent cultural transmission.
Evolution and Human Behavior 29: 56–64.
11. Henrich J, Boyd R (1998) The evolution of conformist transmission and the
emergence of between-group differences. Evolution and Human Behavior 19:
215–241.
12. Henrich J, Boyd R (2001) Why people punish defectors. Weak conformist
transmission can stabilize costly enforcement of norms in cooperative dilemmas.
Journal of Theoretical Biology 208: 79–89.
13. Kameda T, Nakanishi D (2002) Cost-benefit analysis of social/cultural learning
in a nonstationary uncertain environment: An evolutionary simulation and an
experiment with human subjects. Evolution and Human Behavior 23: 373–393.
14. Wakano JY, Aoki K (2007) Do social learning and conformist bias coevolve?
Henrich and Boyd revisited. Theoretical Population Biology 72: 504–512.
15. Nakahashi W (2007) The evolution of conformist transmission in social learning
when the environment changes periodically. Theoretical Population Biology 72:
52–66.
16. Eriksson K, Enquist M, Ghirlanda S (2007) Critical points in current theory of
conformist social learning. Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 5: 67–87.
17. Kendal J, Giraldeau L-A, Laland K (2009) The evolution of social learning rules:
Payoff-biased and frequency-dependent biased transmission. Journal of Theo-
retical Biology 260: 210–219.
18. McElreath R, Bell AV, Efferson C, Lubell M, Richerson PJ, et al. (2008) Beyond
existence and aiming outside the laboratory: estimating frequency-dependent
and pay-off-biased social learning strategies. Philosophical Transactions of the
Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 363: 3515–3528.
19. Richerson PJ, Boyd R (2005) Not by genes alone: how culture transformed
human evolution. Chicago: University of Chicago Press . 332 p.
20. McElreath R, Lubell M, Richerson PJ, Waring TM, Baum W, et al. (2005)
Applying evolutionary models to the laboratory study of social learning.
Evolution and Human Behavior 26: 483–508.
21. Efferson C, Richerson PJ, McElreath R, Lubell M, Edsten E, et al. (2007)
Learning, productivity, and noise: an experimental study of cultural transmission
on the Bolivian Altiplano. Evolution and Human Behavior 28: 11–17.
22. Coultas JC (2004) When in Rome… An evolutionary perspective on conformity.
Group Processes & Intergroup Relations 7: 317–331.
23. Eriksson K, Coultas J (2009) Are people really conformist-biased? An empirical
test and a new mathematical model. Journal of Evolutionary Psychology 7: 5–21.
24. Pike TW, Laland KN (2010) Conformist learning in nine-spined sticklebacks’
foraging decisions. Biology Letters 6: 466–468.
25. Macdonald C, Whiten A (2011) The ‘Living Links to Human Evolution’
Research Centre in Edinburgh Zoo: a new endeavour in collaboration.
International Zoo Yearbook 45: 7–17.
26. Kendal RL, Coolen I, van Bergen Y, Laland KN (2005) Trade-Offs in the
Adaptive Use of Social and Asocial Learning. Advances in the Study of Behavior
35: 333–379.
27. Kendal RL, Coolen I (2009) Adaptive Trade-offs in the Use of Social and
Personal Information. In: Dukas R, Ratcliffe JM, eds. Cognitive ecology II.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. pp 249–271.
28. R Development Core Team (2011) R: A Language and Environment for
Statistical Computing. Vienna, Austria: R Foundation for Statistical Computing.
29. Akaike H (1974) A new look at the statistical model identification. IEEE
Transactions on Automatic Control 19: 716–723.
30. Burnham KP, Anderson DR (2002) Model selection and multimodel inference: a
practical information-theoretic approach. New York: Springer. pp 488.
31. Whiten A, Flynn E (2010) The transmission and evolution of experimental
microcultures in groups of young children. Developmental Psychology 46:
1694–1709.
32. Mesoudi A (2011) An experimental comparison of human social learning
strategies: payoff-biased social learning is adaptive but underused. Evolution and
Human Behavior 32: 334–342.
33. Deutsch M, Gerard HB (1955) A study of normative and informational social
influences upon individual judgment. Journal of Abnormal and Social
Psychology 51: 629–636.
34. Campbell JD, Fairey PJ (1989) Informational and normative routes to
conformity - the effect of faction size as a function of norm extremity and
attention to the stimulus. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 57:
457–468.
35. Whiten A, Horner V, de Waal FB (2005) Conformity to cultural norms of tool
use in chimpanzees. Nature 437: 737–740.
36. Galef BG, Whiskin EE (2008) ‘Conformity’ in Norway rats? Animal Behaviour
75: 2035–2039.
37. Perry S (2009) Conformism in the food processing techniques of white-faced
capuchin monkeys (Cebus capucinus). Animal Cognition 12: 705–716.
Weak or Linear Conformity but Not Hyper-Conformity
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 8 February 2012 | Volume 7 | Issue 2 | e30970
